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NOTES

Jublic use is being preser'd. These plaintiffs include; (a) Citizens protesting the iSSuance of bonds for such a purpose:: 2 (b) Businessmen against
whom taxes are being assessed for the improvement in their area; 33 (c)
Businessmen attacking the operation of parking lots and ramps on the
grounds that such a facility only benefits those people whose businesses
are in close proximity to the faculty, indicating that a private rather than
a public purpose is being preserved; ' 4 (d) Citizens whose property was
to be condemned and the proceedings were later abandoned;3 5 (e) Persons seeking to stop the city from entering into a contract with a private
contractor for the construction of a parking ramp;3 0 (f) Plaintiffs who
want damages for property not actually taken, on the grounds that such
property which is used in conjunction with other property will be worthless for its present use; 3 7 (g) Parking lot operators who have attacked
the taxing of private lots where public lots leased to private operators
are not taxed becatse of the public function heing performed.38
There have been no cases reported in Wyoming on the subject of offstreet parking. Under § 1-173, W.S. 1957, a municipality may condemn
property for public purposes "including streets, alleys or public highways
as sites for public buildings, or for any public purpose." If the statute
were amended to specifically include off-street parking, this would go far
to establish that a public use was involved. Such an amendment should
include: (1)maximum length of leases, (2) minimum rates to be charged,
(3) possible sizes of parking lots varying with the population of the city
in which they are located, (4) the amount of space of such city-operated
parking lots that can be used for private purposes, such as private shops
etc., (5) a city may issue bonds for such a purpose. From what has been
said above, however, a condemnation under such an amendment might
still be subject to challenge on the grounds that the use was private.
Such legislative action would raise a presumption that public purpose
would be served by the construction of parking facilities. However, the
city can avoid any argument that the parking lot is not being used for a
private purpose only by adequate control over the facility after it is put
ROBERT A. DARLING
into operation.
THE AESTHETIC AS A FACTOR CONSIDERED IN ZONING
Emphasis on the nature of beauty and good taste was of definite
concern to philosphers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel and today it
remains a vital subject for legal speculation.' This is particularly true in the
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Reviere v. Orlando Parking Commission, .-- Fla. . 74 So.2d 694 (1956).
Whittier v. Dixon, 24 Cal. 2d 664. 151 P.2d 5 (1944).
Brodhead v. City of Dcnver, 126 Colo. 119, 247 P.2d 140 (1952).
Eways v. Reading Parking Authority, 385 Pa. 592, 124 A.2d 92 (1956).
Supra note 30.
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Cabot v. Assessors of Boston, 335 Mass. 53. 138 N.E.2d 618 (1956).
Bridgwater & Sherwood, The Columbia Encyclopedia, 22 (1956).

VYOMING LAV JOURNAL

field of zoning, where the complexities of urban life are increasingly
demanding the recognition of ae.sihetic factors inl the development of the
commercial and residential areas of our municipalities.
The word "aesthetic" has only slightly changed its spelling and meaning
from the Latin term "aesthetica" which was first used by Baumgarten
about 200 years ago ". . . to designate the science of sensuous knowledge,
2
Conwhose goal is beauty, in contrast with logic, whose goal is truth."
to
"that
which
temporary courts have interpreted this word as pertaining
is beautiful or in good taste." 3
As late as 1923 one court commented that the phrase "to zone" was a
comparatively new expression. It was defined as the partition of a city
into commercial and residential districts, with specific restrictions on physical structures imposed in each district. 4 Zoning regulations have found
particular application in two areas: (a) Structural and architectural regulations which govern the size or bulk of buildings and (b) Regulations
which prescribe the use that may be made of buildings within each district.
The United States Supreme Court has authorized both methods of regulation.'
The general authority for zoning arises out of the police power possessed
by the states. Commonly, legislatures have delegated to their separate
municipalities the authority to enact zoning ordinances. Thus, zoning
ordinances must be reasonable, and can be enacted only for the purpose
of promoting the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community. 6
The division between the dominions of eminent domain (in which
compensation is given for the actual taking of private property) 7 and the
police power (involving a total or partial taking or restriction without
compensation) 8 is sometimes difficult to determine. Zoning regulations
have been sustained under both powers, 9 but of course municipal governments will avoid zoning by the costly power of eminent domain whenever
possible.
Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language, 42 (2d ed. 1956).
Ballentine, Law Dictionary With Pronunciations, 51 (1948).; Black, Black's Law
Dictionary, 78 (4th ed. 1951).
4. State v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 33 A.L.R. 260 (1923).
5. Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 29 S.Ct. 567, 53 L.Ed. 923 (1909) (Upheld the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance which divided a city into districts and
regulated the height of buildings in each district); and Reinman v. Little Rock, 237
U.S. 171, 35 S.Ct. 511, 59 L.Ed. 800 (1915); Hadacheck v. Scbastian, 239 U.S. 394,
36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (1915) authorized the restriction of certain occupations
from specific and defined portions of a city.
f6. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365. 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303,
54 A.L.R. 1016 (1926).
7. Appeal of White, 287 Pa. 259, 134 Atil. 409, 53 A.L.R, 1215 (1926).
S. Ibid.
9. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303,
54 A.L.R. 1016 (1926) (Zoning regulation was sustained under the police power);
State v. Houghtons, 144 Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159, 8 A.L.R. 585 (1920) (zoning regulation was sustained under the power of eminent domain).
2.
3.

SUPREME COURT SECTION

As early as 1905, the traditional rule concerning aesthetic considerations
was announced as being ".
that (where) the regualtion has a reasonable
reference to the safety, health, morals or general welfare of the (municipal)
community, considerations of an aesthetic nature may enter in as an
auxiliary factor and such fact will not invalidate the regulation."'1
The
temper for other early decisions was struck by this court's further caution
that individuals may not be deprived merely because their aesthetic
preferences do not coincide with those of their neighbors, and that
"aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than
of necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the
police power to take property without compensation.""
Four years later the United States Supreme Court, in upholding the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinace prescribing the different height
limitations of buildings, re-phased this rule by stating that the mere
presence of aesthetic considerations will not of themselves invalidate the
12
statute.
During the next five decades, a succession of decisions indicated a
reluctance in many jurisdictions to expand this constricted rule regarding
the application of aesthetic considerations to zoning. The following selected
statements are indicative of the justifications which have been used in
refusing to accept aesthetic considerations as the sole basis for zoning
regulations: "The world would be at a continual -seesaw if aesthetic con3
siderations were permitted to govern the use of the police power."'
"Regulations based on aesthetic considerations are not in accord with the
spirit of our democratic institutions."' 4 "Causes which may depress highly
sensitive persons furnish no basis for restrictions on the use of property by
zoning ordinances."' 5 "The exercise of property rights cannot be left to
caprice, whim, or aesthetic sense of a special group of individuals who may
object to the use by a property owner . . ." of his property. 16 "The zoning
power cannot be exercised from an arbitrary desire to resist the natural
operation of economic laws or for purely aesthetic considerations."' 7
In a quiet New York community an ordinance was adopted in an
attempt to preserve the desirability of a residential area by restricting the
use of the property within the village boundary and thereby provide
a beautiful and dignified frontage along the public throughfare."
In striking down this ordinance the court recognized that the popular
concept of public welfare had been greatly expanded, but it refused to go
10.
11.
12.
13.

Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 62 Atd. 267 (190.5).
Ibid.
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 29 S.Ct. 567, 53 L.Ed. 923 (1909).
City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842,
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43 A.L.R. 662 (1925).
City of St. Louis v. Evraiff, 301 Mo. 231, 256 S.V. 489 (1923).
Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Society v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593 (1932).
Johnson v. City of Huntsville, 249 Ala. 36, 29 So.2d 342 (1947) ; Pentecostal Holiness
Church v. Dunn, 248 Ala. Sup. 314, 27 So.2d 561 (1947).
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Appeal of White, 287 Pa. 259, 134 Ad. 409, 53 A.L.R. 1215 (1926).
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as far as to approve aesthetic considerations as the sule jusification for this
zoning ordinance.1 s In a Pennsylvania case, a proposed structure which
did not harmonize with adjacent buildings was nonetheless held to be
permissible, irrespective of the effect on the neighbors' aesthetic sensibilities, since it came within the regulations of an existing zoning ordinance.' 0
Recently, another decision held that the petition by a waterworks company
to erect a water tower should be granted over the objections of a zoning
board of appeals, which had been based on .aesthetic considerations. The
court stated that the maintenance of the landscaping appearance of the
neighborhood is insufficient in itself to sustain a zoning restriction, though
it does constiute one factor which is to be evaluated with all surrounding
circumstances.20
A portion of another municipal zoning ordinance which provided that
"except when the commissioner of buildings otherwise approves, minor
(car) garages shall be located to the rear of the established line of houses
facing the street," was held to be unconstitutional where the ordinance was
2
based solely on aesthetic considerations of harmony and beautification. '
In addition to these examples, many other cases can be found which
indicate the tenacious hold, in some jurisdictions, of the rule against
allowing aesthetic considerations as the sole basis for zoning regulations. 2 2
But another stream of authority has been developing in recent years
which indicates an increased acceptance of aesthetic factors such as harmony
in the style of homes, symmetry of the streets, beautification of the entire
community, etc., as the actual motivating factor, if not the sole basis, for
the enactment of zoning restrictions under the police powers.
As early as 1911, the eminent Judge Dillon, in his well known treatise
on municipal corporations, acknowledged the traditional rule as it had
then devoloped, but went on to observe that the law concerning aesthetic
considerations was undergoing development and that it could not be said
23
to be conclusively settled with regard to the extent of the police power.
One of the first cases to almost reach the holding that aesthetic considerations alone justified the exertion of the police power, concerned a
suit to require the inspector of buildings in Minneapolis to issue a building
permit for the construction of a three-story building. The municipal
ordinance provided that the realtor's property could be condemned under
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

23.

Dowse), v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427, 86 A.L.R. 642 (1931).
Miller v. Seaman, 137 Pa.- Super. 24, 8 A.2d 415 (1939).
Northport Water Works Co. v. Carll, 133 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1954).
Meade v. City of Cincinnati, 14 Ohio App. 412 (1921).
Ayer v. Commissioners, 242 Mass. 30, 136 N.E. 338 (1922); City of Syracuse v.
Snow, 123 Misc. Rep. 568, 205 N.Y.S. 785 (1924); City of Wilmington v. Turk,
14 Del. Ch. 392, 129 Ail. 512 (1925); Cordts v. Hutton Co., 146 Misc. 10, 262 N.Y.S.
539, affirmed 269 N.Y.S. 936 (1933); Murdock v. City of Norwood, 30 Ohio Supp.
278 (1937) ; Stoner McCray System v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d
843, 58 A.L.R.2d 1304 (1957).
Dillon, Municipal Corporations, § 695 (5th ed. 1911).
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the power of eminent domain, to restrict its use, and thereby effectively
prevent the erection of an apartment building within a restricted residence
area. The court held that this ordinance which provided for condemnation
as the means of restricting the use of property was based upon a public
use and it was therefore constitutional. 24 After noting that other decisions
had allowed, as public uses accomplished through eminent domain, the
addition of a strip on each side of a street for ornament and beauty;
the preservation of the scenic beauty of the river and park along the
Palisades of the Hudson; and the condemnation of the Gettysburg battlefield for its preservation, improvement and ornamentation, the court
added:
Another reason is that giving the people a means to secure for that
portion of a city, wherein they establish their homes, fit and
harmonious surroundings, promotes contenttment, induces further
efforts to enhance the appearance and value of the home, fosters
civic pride, and thus tends to produce a better type of citizen.
It is time that courts recognized the aesthetic as a factor in life.
Beauty and fitness enhance values in public and private buildings. But it is not sufficient that the building is fit and proper
standing alone; it should also fit in with surrounding structures
to some degree. People are beginning to realize this more than
before, and are calling for city planning, by which the individual
homes may be segregated from not only industrial and mercantile
districts, but also from the districts devoted to hotels and apart2.
ments.
Three years later a Kansas court took a stronger stand when it refused
to grant a request for a permit to erect a business building in a residential
section of the city in its holding that a zoning ordinance, designed to
restrict indiscriminate building construction to provide for the harmonious
development of the town, was properly within the expanded definition of
the police power, since there was an aesthetic and cultural side of municipal
development which may be fostered, within limits. 2 6 At least one court has
stated that the above holding meant that aesthetic considerations alone had
justified the enactment of the police power.2
This was apparently based
on the Kansas court's additional statement, following an extensive discussion of aesthetic and cultural considerations, that " (o) ur own court
is committed to the view that, if there is fair ground for differences of
opinion touching the existence of an evil to be remedied, the police power
may be invoked to suppress it, and the Legislature is the exclusive arbiter
28
of when, how, and to what extent it may be invoked."
The same year, a Wisconsin court continued this trend of expounding
a modern doctrine of the police power when it held that a zoning ordinance
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

State v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159, 8 A.L.R. 585 (1920); reversing on
rehearing 174 N.W. 885 (1919).
Ibid.
Ware v. Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99 (1923).
State v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451, 33 A.L.R. 269 (1923).
Supra note 26.
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prohibiting the enlargement of an existing dairy and milk pasteurizing
plant, which was located in a residential district, was not unreasonable.
In arriving at its decision the court declared:
It seems to us that aesthetic considerations are relative in their
nature. With the passing of time, social standards conform to new
ideals. As a race, our sensibilities are becoming more refined,
and that which formerly did not offend cannot now be endured.
Our sensibilities have become more refined and our ideals more
exacting. Nauseous smells have always come tinder the ban of the
law, but ugly sights and discordant surroundings may be just as
distressing to keener sensibilities. The rights of property should
not be sacrificed to the pleasure of an ultra-aesthetic taste. But
whether they should be permitted to plague the average or dominant human sensibilities well may be pondered.2 '
Also in 1923, a southern court held as being valid, a zoning ordinance
which in effect provided for the maintenance of a beautiful and fashionable
part of New Orleans. The court declared that a regard for the outward
appearances of a neighborhood was a matter of the public welfare and
therefore the exercise of the police power was justifiable. This decision
indicated an additional reliance on a nuisance theory in posing this
question: "Why should not the police power avail, as well as to suppress
or prevent a nuisance committed by offending the sense of sight, as to
suppress or prevent a nuisance committed by offending the sense of hearing,
or the olfactory nerves?" 3 0
Some of the subsequent cases have avoided a direct decision as to the
proper status of the aesthetic purpose in zoning by finding other pegs on
which decisions could be hung, such as restricting the heights of buildings
in order to promote the public health 3 l or prohibiting the stripping of the
top soil on a vacant lot for the public welfare,3 2 rather than specifically
admitting that aesthetic considerations were the motivating factors for
these restrictions.
"Harmonious appearance, appropriateness, good taste and beauty displayed in a neighborhood not only tend to conserve the value of property,
but foster contentment and happiness among homeowners" reflected the
views of the Texas court in 1940, when it upheld the validity of a zoning
ordinance which forbade the establishment of an office for the practice
of dentistry in a single-family dwelling district.3 3 The court went on to
say that if aesthetic considerations are concerned with a regard for outward
appearances in the beauty of a neighborhood, then there is no substantial
reason for saying that such a consideration is not a matter of the public
34
welfare.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Supra note 27.
State v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440. 33 A.L.R. 260 (1923).
Brougher v. Board of Public Works, 107 Cal. App. 15, 290 Pac. 140 (1930).
Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 243, 326 U.S. 739, 66 S.Ct. 51 (1945).
Conner v. City of University Park, 142 S.W.2d 706 (1940).
Ibid.
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The United States Supreme Court in 1954 had before it the question
of the constiutionality of a Congressional Act providing for slim clearance in the District of Columbia. It was argued that the Act could not be
justified under the police power and that it was in violation of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court unanimously disagreed
with these contentions and in doing so greatly widened the public welfare
concept, when it declared that:
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic
as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled .... If those who govern the District of Columbia decide
that the Nation's capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary,
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.3 5
This pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court has opened
wide the portals of the police power for the application of aesthetic considerations in zoning. Though the court was dealing with the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment, whereas it is the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment which pertains to the states, at least one court has
considered this distinction to be immaterial in considering the police
36
power's scope.

This latter court went on to uphold, as a valid exercise of the police
power, a zoning ordinance which required a finding by a local board that
the exterior architectural appeal of the proposed structure was in harmony
with the other homes in the neighborhood, so as to not cause a substantial depreciation in property values. In addition, the court added
that "... the general rule is that the zoning power may not be exercised
for purely aesthetic considerations, (and) such rule was undergoing
development. In view of the latest word spoken on the subject by the
United States Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker (citations omitted)
this development of the law has proceeded to the point that it renders
it extremely doubtful that such prior rule is any longer the rule."37
However, an attempt to make unlawful the placing of unconcealed junk
yards near a highway, without the benefit of zoning restrictions, was held
to be unconstitutional in that purely aesthetic considerations are insufficient
by themselves to warrant restrictions upon the lawful use of property.3 8
The Ohio Supreme Court, within this past year, has held that a proposal for the construction of a super-market should have been granted
where the zoning ordinance authorized the granting of a variance in
hardship cases and the intended use was in harmony with the needs and
35.
36.

Berman v. Parker, 38 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954),
State v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, 100 L.Ed. 750, certiorari denied,
350 US. 841, 76 S.Ct. 81 (1955).

37.

Ibid.; Jefferson County v. Timmel, 261 Wis. 39, 51 N.W.2d 518 (1952).

38.

State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959).
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nature of the connnunity.:
'his court gave recognition to what may be
:'.,evc;, greater enlargement of the limits of the police power, when it
indhicated that the expanding concepts of zoning philosophies are beginning
to dictate that in addition to the protection of our neighbor's investment
and an icknowledgement of aesthetic tastes, that future zoning must be
based on long-range planning, taking into account wide interests which
cxtend beyond a consideration of the immediate use of the land in question
and that this consideration must of necessity be correlated with the recrea4
tional, educational and economic needs of the community. 0
The traditional rule, that aesthetic considerations alone are not sufficient to justify the enactment of zoning regulations, is apparently breaking
down and people appear to be dissatisfied and impatient with its restrictive implications. To reflect this change in public opinion the courts are
strelching, sometimes to the point of ridiculousness, their interpretation of
concepts stch as "public welfare," "public health," and *nuisance" so as
to find a legal justification for the inclusion of the aesthetic side of municipal development in new zoning regulations. The time has come to
frankly accept aesthetic considerations as the sole basis for zoning regulations.
In the August, 1922 issue of the American Bar Association Journal, an
article appeared which urged that aesthetic considerations be recognized as
sufficient in themselves to justify reasonable municipal regulations, in the
area of billboard signs, without resort to attenuated theories.
With many protestations and by means of the fantastic argument
that billboards are a menace to public safety, the courts have
nevertheless given aid to the movement for protection .against this
disfigurement. Has the time not come, or at least is it not almost
here, when the courts will drop the mask of an exclusive concern
for safety and health that in the case of billboards is not real, and
regulation of the use of property in
frankly approve reasonable
4
the interest of beauty? 1
To the courts which tenaciously cling to a traditional reliance on a
narrow interpretation of the police power in zoning situations, as extending
to only the safety, health, morals or general welfare of-the community,
yet achieve the same result as the more liberal interpretations by forcing
the aesthetic consideration label into an unfamiliar and strained piegonhole, the question is once again asked: Isn't it time to drop the cloak of an
exclusive concern for the traditional vindications, which oftentimes are not
real, and franiklv approve of aesthetic considerations as being sufficient in
Iheise'l' ( t just i reason:ble regulationst
PAUIo N.
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